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When the Member States of the World HealthAssembly agreed to adopt the revised International
Health Regulations in 2005 (IHR [2005]), no one thought
that the next steps would be easy. The original 194 States
Parties committed to improve global health security by
strengthening the framework for managing public health
emergencies.1 IHR (2005) represented a response to the
challenge posed by emerging infectious diseases, from the
insidious spread of HIV/AIDS over decades to the SARS
crisis, in an era of commonplace international trade and
travel. The revised regulations aimed to improve early de-
tection and response to public health events that might
affect populations across borders by increasing the trans-
parency and timeliness of reporting. The agreement re-
placed historical lists of notifiable diseases with an
algorithm for assessing public health threats in context, and
it conferred new authorities on the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) to collect information and facilitate rapid
evidence-based responses. Countries agreed not only to
share information promptly, but to develop and sustain the
capabilities needed to detect, assess, report, and respond to
any potential public health emergency of international
concern. This unprecedented commitment offered a
foundation for a truly global disease detection and response
network, capable of containing emerging disease threats
when and where they occur to reduce the toll on economies
and human lives. IHR (2005) entered into force in June
2007, beginning a 5-year period for each nation to evaluate
its own current core capacities from the local to the national
level and to develop a plan of action for closing any gaps.2
In June 2012, all States Parties were obligated to report to
WHO either that they had achieved the core capacities re-
quired to implement the revised IHR fully or that they would
require a 2-year extension to implement their action plans.
As of late March 2013, 42 countries (out of 194 reporting
States Parties) had indicated to WHO that they had achieved
all of the core capacities required to implement IHR (2005)
fully; 110 countries requested a 2-year extension with an
implementation plan. An additional 42 countries neither
submitted an extension plan nor indicated that they are in
compliance (Figure 1). As each nation assessed and reported
its own capacities, the self-imposed stringency of the evalua-
tions most likely varied. However, we can clearly say that
approximately 80% of the world’s countries have notmet their
international legal obligations to implement IHR (2005).3
These shortfalls reflect the scope of the tasks rather than a
lack of commitment on the part of health ministries
worldwide. Countries must be prepared to carry out the
core functions of public health surveillance and response for
infectious and noninfectious hazards (including zoonotic,
foodborne, chemical, and radiological/nuclear events as
well as communicable disease outbreaks) at the local, in-
termediate, and national levels and at points of entry. These
capabilities depend on an adequately trained and equipped
public health workforce, a strong surveillance and response
framework, a functional national public health laboratory
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network, a solid legal and regulatory foundation, and ro-
bust multisectoral coordination.
Many countries have struggled even to draft a national
plan of action with specific activities, timelines, and budgets,
as indicated by the silence from a quarter of all States Parties.
Adding to the challenges, the global economic climate has
taken a toll on the willingness of donors to expand their
health assistance commitments, and development partners
have often proved as daunted as their national counterparts
by the complex demands of implementing IHR (2005).
The IHR (2005) agreement implicitly recognized that
mutual assistance would be essential for countries to meet
their obligations. Article 44 calls on States Parties to pro-
vide technical cooperation and logistical support to facili-
tate implementation and to mobilize financial resources for
capacity building. No standing fund to support IHR im-
plementation has ever been created. Few private sector ac-
tors have supported strengthening public health systems
under the IHR framework, which requires an all-hazards
rather than a disease-specific approach. Together with a
handful of other major development partners, the US
government began to increase investments in IHR capacity-
building through bilateral and multilateral channels late in
the initial 2007 to 2012 implementation period—often
with security agencies and resources playing a key role.
Many nations have a long way to go before the next
deadline in 2014. Moreover, the obligation of all WHO
Member States to strengthen and sustain their IHR capa-
cities does not end in 2014. The global community remains
committed to making real progress in building and sus-
taining national core capacities to detect, assess, report, and
respond to public health emergencies of international
concern, but the actual mechanisms for providing this
support have lagged far behind the deadlines and the needs.
Technical Guidance and Standards
In December 2010, WHO released the Checklist and In-
dicators for Monitoring Progress in the Development of IHR Core
Capacities in States Parties (referred to as the IHR Monitoring
Framework). The IHR Monitoring Framework (updated in
2011 and 2012) identified 20 country-level indicators for use
by States Parties in assessing IHR core capacity development.4
Although theMonitoring Framework describes outcomes that
countries should be able to achieve functionally, it does not
prescribe how countries should achieve these outcomes. While
the framework is useful to national health leaders and WHO
for monitoring progress from year to year, it was never in-
tended as a ‘‘how-to’’ guide for national IHR implementation.
During a series of regional IHR stakeholder meetings
convened by WHO in late 2012 and early 2013, health
authorities from dozens of countries called attention to un-
met needs for specific technical assistance, especially in areas
where the revised IHRs demand new competencies (eg, de-
veloping capacities for surveillance and response at points of
entry and for noninfectious hazards). Article 44 calls on
States Parties to collaborate on the development of core ca-
pacities, and the IHR Monitoring Framework stresses that
countries that have successfully achieved core capacity indi-
cators should share lessons learned and best practices. This












Figure 1. Status ofCountry Reports toWHOon Implementation of IHR (2005). Color images available online at www.liebertonline.com/bsp
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WHO regions, due in part to the lack of resources and a
defined global mechanism for sharing such information.
In the short term, learning from the experiences of na-
tional public health leaders and their partners may highlight
promising practices in IHR implementation—if not ‘‘best
bargains,’’ at least a few easy wins. WHO headquarters and
regional offices have generally lacked the resources to re-
search best practices across core capacities, points of entry,
and other hazards. Well-resourced countries could con-
tribute effectively to IHR implementation by documenting,
compiling, and reviewing lessons learned and by helping
countries identify best practices and adapt them for local
context. These best practices could be used to develop or to
validate national strategies, allowing countries to estimate
costs of achieving their desired targets for national bud-
geting and to seek development assistance.
While all countries must ultimately implement IHRs in a
way that builds on existing systems and best serves national
needs, there is no reason that every country should have to
develop guidance such as outreach and education materials de
novo. Some WHO regional offices have developed, or helped
Member States develop, materials that can be used as templates
and adapted nationally. Others can and should follow suit, and
high- and middle-income countries can play significant roles.
The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
for example, hosts a designated WHO Collaborating Center
for IHR Implementation of National Surveillance and Re-
sponse Capacity. With resources, this center could play a key
role in collecting, reviewing, and disseminating lessons learned
from IHR implementation and could work with WHO to
help national authorities evaluate and adapt these for local use
through direct technical assistance and by facilitating reciprocal
visits of national technical leaders in their own regions.
‘‘Potential Hazards’’
In addition to defining the core capacities required to detect,
assess, report, and respond to potential public health emer-
gencies at each level of the health system, the IHRMonitoring
Framework explicitly identified ‘‘potential hazards’’ that call
for specific consideration: zoonotic, foodborne, chemical, and
radiological/nuclear events. Almost every nation with a func-
tional health system has developed some capacities to detect
and respond to high-priority infectious diseases, particularly
locally common epidemic-prone or endemic diseases. How-
ever, many lack well-developed systems to address this cluster
of potential hazards (which are clearly quite distinct from each
other in terms of risk factors). As of 2011, more than two-
thirds of countries that completed WHO questionnaires re-
ported developing at least some capacities for addressing food
safety and surveillance and responding to zoonotic events.
However, these capacities were far from even. Although the
majority of countries had developed plans or policies for
surveillance of foodborne and zoonotic events, half of the
countries reporting from WHO’s Regional Office for the
Americas and more than half of the countries reporting from
WHO’s African and Southeast Asian regions still faced chal-
lenges in sharing information on food safety across sectors.
While coordination between the animal and human public
health sectors appeared slightly better, countries in the African
region, in particular, reported gaps in information-sharing
underlying shortfalls in timely responses to zoonotic events of
national or international concern.5
In contrast, chemical and radiological safety were iden-
tified as relative weaknesses across most WHO regions.
Fewer than half of responding countries globally reported
having achieved the attributes required to detect and re-
spond to chemical and radiation emergencies, with coun-
tries of the African region lagging the farthest behind.5
Although very different in terms of approach and baseline
capabilities, these gaps in preparedness for zoonotic and food
safety events—which require approaches similar to those for
other infectious diseases threats—and in chemical and ra-
diological safety measures point out the challenges in en-
gaging stakeholders across sectors and communities in IHR
implementation. Realistically, countries still facing major
infectious disease burdens have more urgent priorities than
chemical and radiological safety efforts, particularly in the
absence of obvious risks. However, the knowledge to develop
at least a strategy for addressing these threats exists outside
the health sector. At the national level, militaries have often
developed protocols and tools for managing chemical and
radiological risks. Internationally, organizations such as the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and
the International Association for Atomic Energy can be
tapped to provide technical assistance and guidance.
Points of Entry
All Member States must be able to detect, report, and re-
spond to potential public health emergencies at designated
airports, ports, and ground crossings. Some of the re-
quirements at points of entry, such as ship inspection and
sanitation, build on long-standing obligations. Others,
encompassing surveillance and response at borders, place
new demands on core capacities and intersectoral collabo-
ration. Even nations that have made the most progress in
implementing the IHRs struggle with how best to detect
and respond to diseases as they move between nations.
There is currently no standard for how to understand when
success has been achieved, but individual nations have de-
veloped approaches that could be shared with others. This
is a place where nations could come together to share
practices, develop collaborative guides and metrics, and
offer mutual assistance to provide a common understand-
ing and path for moving forward on points of entry.
Resources for Implementation
WHO and individual countries need to build a business
case for IHR implementation in order to garner appropriate
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resources and time. To make use of existing knowledge and
to institutionalize IHRs as part of routine health system
functioning requires a concentrated investment in outreach
and education, from high-level policymakers to community
leaders, and in between. Most importantly, it requires the
identification of resources.
The obligations spelled out in IHR (2005) are binding
on governments, not just health ministries. This was de-
vised to enhance connections across sectors and from na-
tional down to community levels, promoting essential
collaboration among health, agriculture, commerce, trade,
transportation, defense, law enforcement, and other part-
ners. Despite this, the IHR commitment in and of itself
has often failed as leverage to help health leaders build
cross-sectoral relationships, in large part because of the lack
of resources.
Recently, IHR implementation activities have been
supported by security funds, primarily from the US De-
partments of Defense and State, as well as through the
Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction, through the biological
security working group.6 While these funds have been
extremely important to IHR implementation activities,
it is not clear if funding from the security community is
sustainable. In order for progress in building IHR core
capacities to be sustained, IHR must become part of a
holistic approach to health system strengthening and be
fully integrated into the planning processes used by gov-
ernments and their development partners.
Moving Forward
The clock is ticking. We are 5 years into the IHR im-
plementation framework, and it is obvious that 5 years was
an overly ambitious timeline for most countries in the
world. The international community has just begun to hit
its stride in offering the financial and technical assistance
needed to help countries move forward, but major gaps
still exist. The IHRs offer an unprecedented opportunity
to build global capacities to detect and respond to events
in real time, but nations face many competing priorities.
Building core capacities to detect, assess, report, and re-
spond to public health emergencies is hard. Countries are
facing many other hard tasks at the same time, including
building capacities to detect, assess, report, and respond
to endemic infectious diseases, growing noncommunic-
able disease burdens, and other threats to population
health in a nation. Both of these approaches help coun-
tries protect the lives of their citizens, create a safer world,
and ensure healthier populations. Partner nations and
international organizations must do what they can to
help—and that means learning from what has worked in
capacity-building at every level and sharing and acting on
those lessons.
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